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Esta tese desenvolve e estima um modelo de procura de forma a avaliar os 
determinantes da escolha dos consumidores de serviços de empréstimos 
bancários em bancos comerciais. De acordo com a literatura de escolha discreta, 
os consumidores respondem tipicamente ao preço e às características dos 
produtos. Utilizando dados do setor bancário dos E.U.A. de 2011 a 2015, os 
resultados sugerem que os consumidores respondem negativamente a um 
aumento nas comissões de serviço e nas taxas de juro. Além disso, indicam que 
os consumidores preferem bancos mais recentes e que o risco de crédito do banco 
não influencia o processo da tomada de decisão. 
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This thesis develops and estimates a demand model for commercial bank loan 
services to assess the determinants of consumer bank lending choice involving 
commercial banks. Following the discrete choice literature, consumers typically 
respond to price and product characteristics. Using data from the U.S. banking 
industry from 2011 to 2015, the results suggest that consumers respond 
negatively to an increase in service fees and in loan interest rates. Furthermore, 
they indicate that consumers prefer younger banks and that asset risk does not 
influence the decision-making process. 
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United States (U.S.) bank loans are experiencing the fastest annual expansion 
since 2007, which may be a sign of greater confidence, but also that lenders are 
taking too much risk. The Eurozone is experiencing a different scenario since 
there policymakers’ efforts to promote lending to businesses have hardly 
succeeded. It is common knowledge that lending is the primary source of 
revenue for banks and, therefore, it is only natural that, on one hand, banks may 
take too much risk and, on the other hand, regulators intend to discourage the 
amount of risk that banks take.1  
 
This thesis develops and estimates a demand model for commercial bank loan 
services to assess the determinants of bank lending choice in commercial banks, 
with a particular focus in evaluating the impact of banks’ asset risk policies on 
U.S. bank lending. Although the thesis examines the U.S. banking market, I 
believe that its main findings, concerning the determinants of bank lending, may 
be valid for commercial banks in other countries. This belief is corroborated by 
the fact that empirical studies across a variety of different countries tend to use 
the same set of bank characteristics when estimating demand for bank services. 
 
Bank loan services constitute a differentiated product. Different banks offer 
slightly different substitute loan services. As a consequence, in order to estimate 
a demand model for loan services, I will follow the discrete choice literature 
(Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) and modelled investor decisions 
as a function of loan prices and bank characteristics. The proposed model is 
estimated for the U.S. commercial banking sector over 2011-2015, using a data set 
                                                 
1 https://www.ft.com/content/17d3caf6-e310-11e5-bc31-138df2ae9ee6 
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that combines information from one specific website, usbanklocations.com. In 
particular, the loan prices will be decomposed into service fees and loan interest 
rate, and the set of bank characteristics will be the number of branches, the bank’s 
age, the number of employees per branch, the asset risk and the number of states 
in which a bank operates. This work departs from the existing literature since, to 
the best of my knowledge, a demand model for loan services has not yet been 
applied to the U.S. commercial banking industry and asset risk has not been 
incorporated in the set of bank characteristics. 
 
The results suggest that the consumers decision-making process concerning 
bank lending is influenced by (i) loan interest rates, (ii) service fees, and (iii) bank 
age. All other characteristics, including bank asset risk, seem not to affect this 
process. Further, the results also suggest that consumer choice is inelastic with 
respect to service fees, suggesting that banks have considerable market power, 
but choose not to abuse it. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a 
literature review on demand estimation in the banking industry. In Section 2, the 
empirical framework is outlined, including the main definitions and the demand 
model itself. In Section 3, the data and the estimation procedures are presented. 




1. Literature Review 
1.1. Empirical Framework 
The banking industry literature supports the decision to follow a discrete 
choice approach (Dick, 2008; Molnár, Márton and Csilla, 2006; Nakane, Alencar 
and Kanczuk, 2006; Brito, Pereira and Ribeiro, 2008). In particular, the decision 
to estimate standard and nested multinomial logit demand models. Dick (2008) 
was the first to apply a structural demand model based on consumer choice 
under product differentiation on retail deposit services, and most of the 
subsequent literature adopts her framework.  
 
Dick (2008) estimates a demand model for deposit services using data on U.S. 
commercial banks to examine (i) what characterizes consumer behaviour in 
banking services, (ii) what are the levels of competition in the industry, and (iii) 
how does consumer welfare get affected by policy changes (for example, the 
deregulation of bank’s geographic scope). As discussed above, Dick (2008) 
follows a discrete choice literature where consumer decisions are based on prices 
and a set of bank characteristics. Therefore, she estimates a standard multinomial 
logit model and a nested logit model. In the latter she groups banks into those 
that operate in more than one state and those that operate in exactly one state. 
She decomposes price into service fees and deposit interest rate, thus in this 
framework it is natural to assume that, on one hand, if service fees increase, the 
demand for deposits will decrease and so will the investors’ utility, and, on the 
other hand, if the deposit interest rate increases the demand for deposits will also 
increase and so will the investors’ utility. Regarding the observed bank 
characteristics, she includes in the analysis variables that are observed at the bank 
level and at the bank-market level, and that are assumed to be important and 
 14 
perceptible to the consumer. Thus, the observed bank characteristics are: the 
number of local branches per square mile; the number of employees per branch, 
which may be correlated with the waiting time; bank size (measured discretely 
as large, medium or small), that may capture the perceived service quality and 
the lower probability of failure attached to larger banks; the number of states in 
which the bank has presence, which may measure the value attached to network 
size and geographic diversification; and bank age, which may be a proxy for 
experience and expertise. Moreover, Dick (2008) incorporates control variables 
for demographic differences across local markets, such as income per capita and 
population density, and interacts them with the bank characteristics. The 
intention is to explore if consumers in more populated areas value more the 
number of branches in the local market. 
 
Molnár, et al. (2006) estimate a demand model for deposit and loan services 
using data on Hungarian commercial banks to examine the degree of competition 
in the Hungarian household credit and deposit markets. They also decompose 
price into service fees and, deposit or loan interest rate, and include Dick (2008)’s 
set of bank characteristics, at the national-level, with the major difference being 
the fact that they use bank size as nests, while Dick (2008) uses it as a 
characteristic and nests the banks into those that are geographically diversified 
(by operating in more than one state) and those that have branches in exactly one 
state.  
 
Nakane, et al. (2006) estimate a demand model for deposit and loan services 
using data on Brazilian commercial banks to examine the degree of competition 
in the Brazilian banking industry. They also separate price into service fees and, 
deposit and loan interest rates. However, regarding the bank characteristics, their 
approach is slightly different from Dick (2008) and from Molnár et al. (2006) since 
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they use bank characteristics at two levels: characteristics at the market-level (in 
their application, municipality) and characteristics at the country level. The 
observable market-level bank characteristics are: the number of bank branches in 
the municipality, the number of ATMs in the municipality, the branch density in 
the municipality, and the ATM density in the municipality. The observable 
country-level characteristics are: the number of bank branches in the country, the 
number of ATMs in the country, the number of states where the bank operates, 
bank age, the number of bank employees, the average number of bank employees 
per branch, and advertisement costs. Both Dick (2008) and Nakane, et al. (2006) 
use variables to control for demographic differences across local markets. While 
Dick (2008) interacts bank characteristics with income and population, Nakane, 
et al. (2006) interact bank characteristics with municipality-level GDP per capita 
and use, as control variables, municipality-level GDP, GDP per capita, 
geographic area, and population density. 
1.2. Estimation Procedure 
In this framework, as discussed above, price can be decomposed into two 
variables: loan interest rates and service fees. Both are charged to a consumer that 
is willing to buy a bank’s service and it is natural to assume that if they increase, 
the demand for loans will decrease and so will the investors’ utility. This brings 
us to the endogeneity problem that arises in the estimation of the models above. 
Due to the fact that not all bank characteristics are observed by the researcher 
and price variables may be correlated with these unobserved characteristics. Dick 
(2008) states that these variables can be the bank’s service quality, reputation 
linked to its soundness as a financial institution, prestige and expertise but also 
the ability to counter systemic financial distress. Therefore, banks with better 
unobserved characteristics may charge consumers more for this attribute. As a 
consequence, the price variables need to be instrumented. Molnár, et al. (2006) 
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and Nakane, et al. (2006) follow Dick (2008)’s approach in using cost shifters and 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (hereafter BLP)’s, suggestion as instruments 
for price. Cost shifters denote direct cost variables, product mix, and balance 
sheet structure variables. The idea of using cost shifters as instruments, is that, a 
bank’s cost of operating may impact the bank’s pricing decisions, however it is 
not expected that they have a significant quality component, in other words, they 
are not expected to be correlated with the unobserved bank characteristics. BLP’s 
suggestion consists of using the characteristics of other products in the market as 
instruments for price. The reasoning behind this approach is that given the 
location of products in the characteristic space, price will be correlated with the 
characteristics of other products and therefore products that have close 
substitutes will have lower markups, while other products located further away 
from rival ones will have higher prices relative to cost.  
 
2. Empirical Framework 
2.1. Definitions for a model of loan services demand 
Consumer decision: 
Consumers are expected to value and to be able to recognize several bank 
attributes when searching for a loan service. Though price might be considered 
the most relevant characteristic, also the overall quality and effectiveness of the 
service such as the waiting time or the perceived expertise and experience of a 
certain bank, may influence the consumer decision-making process.  
 
Consumers: 
The demand model focuses on loan services, which include real estate loans, 
farm loans, commercial and industrial loans, loans to individuals and all other 
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loans and leases. Therefore, the analysis includes the decisions of two types of 
consumers in the banking industry: households and nonfinancial businesses. 
Further, these consumers can be national or international, since the data 
aggregated loans from both domestic offices and non-U.S. addresses.  
 
Commercial bank competitors: 
Regulators classify the institutions that offer financial services into depositary 
and non-depositary institutions. Depositary institutions such as commercial 
banks, thrifts, savings banks and credit unions offer loan services by lending the 
money saved by depositors. Non-depositary institutions include finance 
companies, brokerages, mortgage lenders and venture capital firms. 
 
Due to data limitations, only commercial banks will be considered, some of 
which will be modelled as inside options while some of which will be modelled, 
in aggregated terms, as the outside option. A commercial bank is included in the 
inside options if it accounted for at least one quarter of one percent in one of the 
years (to be defined below). 
 
Output Quantity: 
The output quantity a bank “produces” can be measured in terms of the 
number of loan accounts or in terms of dollar volume. Both regulators and the 
industry refer to output in terms of dollar volume which is a more realistic 
approach to measure the activity in the market. Therefore, the data used in this 
research is in dollar volume and aggregated at the bank-level.  
 
To determine the potential size of the market, I follow the traditional approach 
of the discrete choice demand literature by defining it as the local market 
population. Similarly to Molnár, et al. (2006), I consider the relevant geographic 
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market to be the whole country. This decision was mainly influenced by data 
constraints. 
2.2. Demand model 
Demand is derived and estimated following a discrete choice approach. This 
methodology solves the dimensionality problem existent when there are many 
options in the market, as in the case of the banking industry, by making the 
relevant dimension the dimension of the characteristics, and not the number of 
banks. The discrete model approach attempts to represent choice situations in 
which consumers choose just one option from the choices available. Therefore, 
this approach adds the following constraint on the choice set of consumers: each 
consumer chooses at most one inside option or alternatively chooses the outside 
option. 
 
Gorman (1956) and Lancaster (1966) suggest that, under the discrete choice 
approach, consumers choose the options so to maximize their utility based on the 
intrinsic characteristics of the options, rather than based on the option in itself. 
Therefore, choosing an option will provide a bundle of characteristics that yield 
an utility stream equivalent to the utility provided by the option in itself. 
However, the utility provided by each option will depend on the consumer’s 
individual preferences and income. In sum, the utility derived from choosing a 
given option will be a function of two sets of factors: consumer and product 
characteristics. 
 
In this framework, consumers choose from which bank they want to purchase 
loan services by determining which bank characteristics maximize their 
individual utility. To do so, consider a setting with i=1,…,I consumers, each of 
which with j=0,…,J bank options (where j=0 denotes the outside option) in each 
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t=1,…,T year. Let the preferences of consumer i in year t be captured by the vector 
𝜺𝑖𝑡 (to be discussed below), the vector of characteristics of bank j in year t be 
denoted by 𝒘𝑗𝑡 and the vector of prices charged by bank j in year t be represented 
by 𝒑𝑗𝑡. Thus, the conditional indirect utility that consumer i obtains from an 
inside option bank j in year t will take the form of 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑈(𝒑𝑗𝑡,𝒘𝑗𝑡; 𝜺𝑖𝑡). 
 
I follow Berry (1994) in assuming this utility to be can be represented by a 
linear function with two parts, a product-specific mean (across consumers) utility 
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝒑𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜶 + 𝒘𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜷 that is common to all consumers and the individual-specific 
deviations from that mean, as follows: 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝒑𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜶 + 𝒘𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜸 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡. (1) 
 
This implies that the preferences of consumer i in year t can, under this 
formulation, be represented by the vector of the individual-specific deviations 
(from the mean) for the different options: 𝜺𝑖𝑡 ≡ ( 𝑖0𝑡, 𝑖1𝑡, … , 𝑖𝐽𝑡). 
 
However, a researcher must acknowledge that not all bank characteristics will 
be observed in the analysis, which implies that consumer i's utility is, in fact, a 
function of product characteristics unobserved by the researcher (but observed 
by the consumer), such as prestige and service quality. Berry (1994) addresses 
this problem by splitting the characteristics’ utility in two parts: 𝒘𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜸 = 𝒙𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜷 +
𝜉𝑗𝑡, where 𝒙𝑗𝑡 denotes a set of K observed characteristics for bank j in year t, and 
𝜉𝑗𝑡 represents the utility associated to the unobserved characteristics of bank j in 
year t. This implies that I can write the conditional indirect utility of consumer i 
from choosing bank j’s loan services in year t as, 
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′ 𝜷 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡, (2) 
 
where, as discussed above, I include as price variables 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑓
 and 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑟 , which 
represent the service fee and the loan interest rate, respectively, charged by the 
bank on their loan services. Thus, the parameters to estimate are 𝛼𝑓, 𝛼𝑟 and K 
𝛽’s. Thus, each consumer chooses the bank that maximizes his utility.  
 
This implies that adding or subtracting an arbitrary constant from the utility 
of each option does not impact the solution. As a consequence, all such 
preferences are observationally equivalent and we must impose a normalization 
if we wish to identify the parameters of such model. Generally, authors choose 
to normalize the utility of the outside option in year t to zero 𝛿0𝑡 = 0 so that the 
normalized conditional indirect utility for the outside option in year t is: 𝑢𝑖0𝑡 =
𝑖0𝑡. 
 
Since, each consumer chooses the bank that maximizes his utility, notice that 
consumer i chooses bank j in year t whenever 𝑈(𝜺𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 , 𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝜉𝑗𝑡; 𝜃𝐷) ≥
𝑈(𝜺𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑘𝑡, 𝑥𝑘𝑡, 𝜉𝑘𝑡; 𝜃𝐷), for k=0,…,J, where k=0 represents the outside option, in 
which the consumer chooses to stay out of the market and allocate his resources 
to other things. The dimensional vector 𝜽𝐷 = (𝛼
𝑓 , 𝛼𝑟 , 𝜷) denotes the parameters 
to be estimated, 𝑖𝑡 represents the distribution of consumer specific characteristics 
and is assumed to be known. The consumer’s choice rule implicitly delineates the 
set of 𝑖𝑡 that results in the purchase of product j in year t. Let 𝐴𝑗𝑡 be the set of 
values of  that promotes the choice of product j in year t: 
 
𝐴𝑗𝑡 = {𝜺: 𝑈(𝜺𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝜉𝑗𝑡; 𝜃𝐷) ≥ 𝑈(𝜺𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑘𝑡, 𝑥𝑘𝑡, 𝜉𝑘𝑡; 𝜃𝐷) for 𝑘 = 0, … , 𝐽} (3) 
 
 21 
Thus, the aggregate demand is obtained by integrating the choice function, 𝐴𝑗𝑡, 
over the distribution of 𝜺 in the population. Hence, the market share of product j 
in year t is given by the probability of 𝜺𝑖𝑡 falling into region 𝐴𝑗𝑡, for all i. 
 
One of the most used and straightforward approach to the discrete choice 
model is the multinomial logit demand model developed by McFadden (1978, 
1981). The multinomial logit demand model makes a simplifying, yet restrictive, 
assumption about the distribution of consumer preferences. It assumes that (i) 
the individual-specific deviations (from the mean) for the different options 
( 𝑖0𝑡, 𝑖1𝑡, … , 𝑖𝐽𝑡) is i.i.d. across options and consumers, and (ii) each 𝑖𝑗𝑡 has a 
standard type I extreme value density function.2 Under this assumption, the 








 , (4) 
 
where 𝜹𝑡 ≡ (𝛿0𝑡, 𝛿1𝑡, … , 𝛿𝐽𝑡). 
 
While this result constitutes one of the main advantages of the logit demand 
model, for its computational simplicity, it imposes restrictive substitution 
patterns (as I will discuss below when I address the price elasticities). As an 
illustration, consider that an irrelevant option (in the sense that is a perfect 
substitute of an existing option) enters in the market. This new option should 
only impact the market share of the existing, perfect substitute option. However, 
the market share function discussed above would predict an impact on the 
                                                 





market share of all options, which is not expected and contradicts economic 
intuition.3 
 
An alternative approach to the multinomial logit model is the nested 
multinomial logit demand model. The nested logit model, as explained by Berry 
(1994), is based on the assumption that each consumer chooses a product in two 
stages: first they decide from which segment g=0,…,G they choose to buy from, 
and at the second stage they choose which product to buy from within that 
group. In the banking industry case, each of the groups consists of a set of 
commercial banks and each bank is only in one group. This alternative approach 
reduces the implausible substitution patterns problem. It does so by introducing 
a correlation in the preferences of each consumer across options within a group, 
which requires an a priori grouping of options into G+1 exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive sets. The resulting conditional indirect utility of consumer i from 
choosing bank j’s loan services (a bank that belongs, for example to group g) in 
year t is now given by: 
 





′ 𝜷 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + {𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎) 𝑖𝑗𝑡}, 
(5) 
 
where 𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡 denotes the preference of consumer i for the options in group g in year 
t. This implies that when in year t, for example, an option from group g becomes 
more expensive, consumers with a high taste for group g, i.e., consumers with a 
large 𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡 , will tend to substitute for other options in that group (since the indirect 
utility will be higher for those options). As it approaches one, the correlation 
between options within the group approaches one as well, and as it approaches 
                                                 
3 For further nuances on this matter, see McFadden’s (1973) red bus/blue bus example. 
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zero so does the model approximates to the usual logit demand model and the 
correlation between products in a given group becomes zero.   
 
Cardell (1997) shows that 𝜍𝑖𝑔𝑡 has a distribution that depends on 𝜎 and that 
the aggregated markets shares that result from the consumer maximization 
problem are, as for the multinomial logit demand model, also analytic. However, 
for the model to be consistent with utility maximization, 𝜎 is restricted to be 
between zero and one. 
 


















Where 𝐷𝑔𝑡 is the utility function of all the banks in group g. Hence, equation 







Therefore, by combining the two equations derived above, (6) and (7), one can 




𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝜹𝑡) = 𝑠𝑗𝑡|𝑔(𝜹𝑡)𝑠𝑔𝑡(𝜹𝑡) (9) 
 
While this result remains fairly simple to compute it comes at the cost of 
having to estimate an additional parameter, and, as I will discuss below, the need 
for additional instruments. 
2.3. Estimation Procedure 
The aggregate market share equations for bank j in year t implied by the 
standard and nested multinomial logit demand models (i) are highly non-linear 
and (ii) involves the utility terms associated to the unobserved characteristics of 
all J bank in year t. It is not obvious how to run a regression in such cases. 
Fortunately, the literature provides a way to recover the unobserved common 
mean utility for every bank in each year, which then allows me to estimate the 
parameters of the two demand models by estimating a simple linear equation. I 
now describe how to recover the vector of unobserved common mean utilities 
for each bank in each year, in turn, for each demand model 
 
Multinomial Logit Demand Model: 
Let 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗  denote bank j’s observed market share in year t, while 𝑠𝑗𝑡 is the 
corresponding market share predicted by the model. By choosing the vector of 
mean utilities 𝜹𝑡 to make the multinomial logit model’s predicted market shares 
exactly match the observed market shares we get the following equation:  
 
𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝜹𝑡) = 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗  for j=1,…,J (10) 
 
Since 𝜹𝑡 ≡ (𝛿0𝑡, 𝛿1𝑡, … , 𝛿𝐽𝑡) this implies a system o J equations with J unknowns. 
If the J equations match the predicted and actual market share for all inside 
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options, then the same is true for the outside option 𝑠0𝑡(𝜹) = 𝑠0𝑡
∗ , since both the 
actual and the predicted market shares must add to one. 
 
Dividing each of J inside option equalities by the equality referent to the 








∗  for j=1,…,J (11) 
 
 




 for j=1,…,J (12) 
 
 





  (13) 
 
 








∗  for j=1,…,J (14) 
 
By taking logs on both sides of equation (14), one obtains the following 
expression for 𝛿𝑗𝑡  : 
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𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡(𝒑𝑗𝑡, 𝒘𝑗𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡
∗  (15) 
 
 
This allows one to write and estimate a linear equation with 𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡
∗  as 
the dependent variable: 
 
𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡





′ 𝜷 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 , (16) 
 
Where, the commonly known error term, 𝜉𝑗𝑡, denotes the valuation for the 
unobserved characteristics. Thus, 𝛿𝑗𝑡 is uniquely determined by the observed 
market shares in each year. Given the simple linear model derived in equation 
(16), one can estimate 𝛼𝑓, 𝛼𝑟 and 𝜷 with linear estimation techniques, by 
regressing 𝛿𝑗𝑡 on 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑓
, 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑟  and 𝒙𝑗𝑡
′ . I should note, however, that to do so, I must deal 
with the possible endogeneity of the price variables using instrumental variables 
techniques. 
 
Nested Multinomial Logit Demand Model: 











∗  for j=1,…,J (17) 
 
By taking logs on both sides of the equation derived above, one gets a system 
of J equations as follows: 
 





∗ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡
∗  
for j=1,…,J (18) 
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However, in order to compute equation (18), I first need to derive the value of 
𝐷𝑔𝑡, which is unknown. To do so, note that if the observed and predicted markets 
shares are matched for all inside options, then the same is true for the markets 









∗  for g=0,…,G (19) 
 
As a result, all the markets shares of the different banks within their group will 






∗  for all j ∈ g (20) 
 





− 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑔𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡|𝑔
∗ , for all j ∈ g (21) 
 
where 𝑙𝑛 (𝑠𝑗𝑡|𝑔
∗ ) represents the log of the market share of bank j in year t within 
group g, which is also observed. This result allows me to obtain the unknown 
value of 𝐷𝑔𝑡, as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑔𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡/(1 − 𝜎) − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡|𝑔
∗  for j=1,…,J (22) 
 




𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜎𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡|𝑔
∗
= 𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡
∗  
for j=1,…,J (23) 
 
This allows me to write and estimate a linear equation with 𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡
∗  as 
the dependent variable, exactly as in the standard logit model. Therefore, under 




∗ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑠0𝑡
∗ = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜎𝑙 𝑛(𝑠𝑗𝑡|𝑔







∗ ) + 𝜉𝑗𝑡. 
(24) 
 
In this linear equation, the price variables continue to be potentially 
endogenous. However, now, also the within group share variable will be 
potentially endogenous, since market shares are likely to be correlated with 
unobserved characteristics. Therefore, additional instruments will be needed to 
obtain a consistent estimate of 𝜎. 
 
 
3. Data Description 
3.1. Data Sources 
I use data collected from usbanklocantions.com website and from each bank 
institutional website. usbanklocations.com aggregates information from balance 
sheets and income statements, and uses it to construct rankings for almost all 
balance sheet and income statement items. All the variables discussed below 
were collected from usbanklocations.com with the exception of the information on 
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each bank year of opening, which was taken from the banks’ institutional 
websites.  
 
The sample covers the period from 2011 to 2015 and is collected from the 
fourth quarter reports of each year. As mentioned above, a commercial bank is 
included in the inside options if it accounted for at least one quarter of one 
percent of the market in one of the years under analysis, totalling 57 banks.4 In 
the estimation, an observation is defined as a bank-year combination.  
3.2. Explanatory Variables 
Price: 
Two types of prices are observed in the banking industry: (i) the service fee 
charged by the bank for its services and (ii) the interest rate charge by the bank 
for the loan. The two prices would naturally differ across different loan products. 
However, I was only able to collect aggregated data. Thus, I created an average 
service fee and interest rate for each bank in each year, by diving the 
corresponding total fee and interest income, respectively, by total loans. 
 
Bank Characteristics: 
The set of bank characteristics are derived from Dick (2008) and Molnár et al. 
(2006) with the exception of asset risk, which I added to the set of bank 
characteristics, so to examine how it impacts consumer loan service choice.  
 
From Dick (2008) and Molnár et al. (2006), I include the following 
characteristics: (i) the number of branches of each bank in each year, (ii) the 
number of states in which the bank has presence, (iii) the number of employees 
                                                 
4 For example, if bank j had a market share higher than 0,25% only in a given year, I still included it in the remaining 
years. The market share was calculated by dividing each banks’ total loans in year t by the sum of total loans for 
all banks in that year. 
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per branch, and (iv) bank age. I use (i) in contrast to Dick (2008) that uses the 
number of local branches per square mile, since my local market is the whole 
country, which implies that the number of branches in the country will be the 
same as the number of branches per square mile. This should be an important 
bank attribute since it is assumed to be correlated with the transaction costs of 
going to the chosen bank.5 I use (ii) to measure the value attached to geographic 
diversification and to network size. This is the only variable that does not change 
throughout the years, since I was not able to collect data on the number of states 
in which the bank was present in each year. Therefore, I use the most recent 
information. In the logit demand model this variable will be used as a bank 
characteristic, while in the nested logit model it will be used to nest the banks 
into two groups. I use (iii) to proxy for the waiting time since more staffed 
branches are expected to have a lower waiting time. Finally, I use (iv) to capture 
the perceived degree of experience and expertise of a bank. 
 
As mentioned earlier, I propose to extend the literature by including an asset 
risk as a bank characteristic. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) present two asset risk 
measures. The first consists of a composite measure, typically used by regulators.6 
The second consists of a loan portfolio quality measure, computed as the ratio of 
one-half of loans classified as past due 90 days or more (and still accruing) plus 
the loans classified as nonaccrual to total loans. The former involves data that I 
could not collect and therefore, I used the latter. I should note, however, that 
Meeker and Gray (1987) found that this form of loan portfolio quality calculation 
                                                 
5 If a bank does not have a branch near your home or business it will become less likely that you choose that bank, 
since it will be more expensive to choose that bank than to choose one near you. 
6 The composite measure of asset risk is described as follows (weights are in parentheses): noninterest-bearing 
balances and currency and coin (0); interest-bearing balances (0.25); short-term US treasury and government 
agency debt securities (0.10); long-term US government and agency debt securities (0.25); state and local 
government securities (0.50); bank acceptances (0.25); Fed funds sold and securities purchased under agreements 
to resell (0.25); standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees (0.75); loan and lease financing commitments 
(0.25); commercial letters of credit (0.50); and all other assets (1.00). The weighted sum of these asset amounts is 
then divided by total assets.  
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in a given year will only be reflected in past due and nonaccrual classifications 
until the following period. In order to test this hypothesis, I estimated the 
demand models using the asset risk variable of the following year as the asset 
risk characteristic of a given year. Given the results were very similar to the ones 
I obtained using the asset risk variable of each year, I chose to use this last 
measure since they allowed me to also use data on the last year of the sample 
(2015). 
3.3. Instrumental Variables 
The price variables include, as discussed above, service fees and loan interest 
rates: 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑓
  and 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑟 , both of which will be a function of the valuation for the 
unobserved bank characteristics 𝜉𝑗𝑡. Although the researcher might not be able 
to observe these characteristics, it is reasonable to assume that banks and 
consumers know them, and if so, that banks will take them into account when 
setting prices. Therefore, the price variables are likely to be correlated with them.  
 
The correlation between the price variables and the valuation for the 
unobserved bank characteristics induces endogeneity, requiring instrumental 
variables (IV) techniques. The fact that these demand models focus on a 
differentiated market poses a problem when choosing the right instruments. A 
relevant and valid instrument needs to be correlated with the price variables 
(relevance) and uncorrelated with the error term – here, the valuation for the 
unobserved bank characteristics (validity). The main instruments used are 
variables that shift cost, such as Dick (2008)’s cost shifters, since they are in fact 
correlated with price since firms will take them into account when making 
pricing decisions, and are uncorrelated with the error term since they are 
exogenous to the unobserved characteristics, which means that they do not have 
an impact on demand other than affecting price. To deal with this problem, 
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Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) and Hausman (1996) suggest using the price 
variables of bank j in other regions as instruments for the prices variables in a 
given region. However, I am not able to use this approach since my data does not 
vary by region. Berry, et al. (1995) suggest the alternative of using characteristics 
of other banks in the market as instruments for the price variables. This last 
approach not only fits my data, but has the added advantage of having been used 
by all the past literature that examined this type of demand models in the 
banking industry. In addition to the BLP instruments I will also use a set of cost 
shifters derived from Dick (2008)’s work. 
 
Cost Shifters: 
Following Dick (2008) and all the subsequent literature, I computed a set of 
cost shifters from actual cost data. They include direct cost variables related to 
operating expenses as well a balance sheet variable which is cash adjusted by 
assets. 
 
The direct cost variables include the three types of operating expenses: (i) 
labour, (ii) expenses on premises and fixed assets, and (iii) other operating 
expenses, all of which are adjusted by total assets. As discussed by Dick (2008), 
there can be plausible situations where these instruments might fail the validity 
requirement. This is more evident for labour expenses, where salaries may be 
correlated with the service quality. For example, if a bank hires more skilled 
employees they will tend to be more expensive, but provide a higher service 
quality (typically valued by consumers). This means that the validity 
requirement would be violated, since salaries would be correlated with the 
valuation for the unobserved bank characteristics. To overcome this problem, 
following Dick (2008), I compute a measure of “potential labour costs”, an 
alternative measure of labour costs based on the salaries of all banks weighted 
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by each bank market share in a given year. To compute this measure, I sum these 
weighted salaries in each year, multiply the result by each bank number of 
employees, and then divide it by the bank total assets. Because the other two cost 
variables are expected to have no significant quality component, since they refer 
to operating expenses such as electricity, amortization and depreciation, 
insurance, and maintenance costs, I assume as Dick (2008) that they satisfy the 
validity requirement.  
 
BLP Instruments: 
Following BLP, I use the characteristics of all other banks, such as the number 
of branches, the number of employees per branch, the age of the bank, the asset 
risk and, in the standard multinomial logit demand model, the number of states 
in which the bank has presence, as instruments for each bank’s price variables. 
 
Instruments for the within group share: 
As discussed above, the nested multinomial logit demand model requires 
additional instruments, due to the endogeneity problem of the within group 
share variable.  
 
In order to instrument this variable, I use (i) the BLP instruments differentiated 
by groups, i.e., the characteristics of all other banks in the group (following Dick, 
2008), and (ii) cost shifters, differentiated by group. 
3.4. Summary Statistics 
Table I presents summary statistics for all the variables used. The median bank 
market share is 0,587%, which charges a median service fee of 0,013% which is 
equivalent to an increase in the loan interest rate of 0,013 pp, and a median 
interest rate on loans of 4,107%. In terms of characteristics, the median bank has 
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an asset risk of 1,133%, has 30 employees per branch, 226 branches, started 
operating 82 years ago and has physical presence in 5 states. 
 
Variable Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Market Share 0,578% 1,322% 2,308% 0,005% 10,580% 
Servicing Fees 0,013% 0,105% 0,270% -0,802% 1,743% 
Loan interest rate 4,107% 5,003% 2,871% 1,315% 16,967% 
Asset Risk 1,133% 1,617% 1,717% 0,000% 12,547% 
Nr of employees per branch 30 985 2822 1 18193 
Nr of branches 226 803 1413 1 6393 
Age of bank 82 82 64 1 211 
Nr of states of bank’s operations 5 8 9 1 42 
Expenses on premises and fixed assets / Assets 0,270% 0,235% 0,148% 0,000% 0,640% 
Other expenses / Assets 1,034% 1,779% 2,287% 0,173% 14,446% 
Cash / Assets 0,789% 0,750% 0,587% 0,000% 2,330% 
Labour costs / Assets 927,800 849,380 503,541 0,179 2345,465 
Nr of observations 266     
Table I – Summary Statistics 
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
Table II presents the estimation results for three specifications of our demand 
model. The first specification, presented in column (i), denotes the standard 
multinomial logit demand model, estimated by ordinary least squares. The 
second specification, presented in column (ii), denotes the same demand model, 
estimated by instrumental variables. The third and final specification, presented 
in column (iii), denotes the nested multinomial logit demand model, estimated 
by instrumental variables. All specifications include the price variables and the 
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set of observed characteristics discussed above as well as year and bank fixed 
effects. 
 
The results for the first specification suggest that consumers respond negative 
and significantly to the service fees, however, the loan interest rate is not 
significant and, therefore, states that consumers are not influenced by this price 
variable when choosing a bank, which is not expected and unrealistic. This means 
that if the service fees increase, the mean utility of the bank in the loan service 
market will decrease. This result is consistent with what one would theoretically 
expect. Further, the results also suggest that consumers value negative and 
significantly the loan portfolio quality of the bank, as measured by its asset risk. 
Finally, the results also suggest that consumers value positive and significantly 
the number of branches a bank has available for them to purchase their services 
and the bank’s age, which may be related to the bank’s perceived experience and 
expertise, but respond negative and significantly to the number of states in which 
the bank has presence. All remaining bank characteristics are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that they do not impact the consumers decision-making 
process. 
 
However, the ordinary least squares estimates are likely biased due to the 
potential endogeneity of the price variables, since those variables are presumably 
correlated with the valuation for the unobserved bank characteristics. The 
estimation results for the second specification, based on both cost shifters and on 
BLP instruments, indicate that service fees and loan interest rates continue to be 
highly significant and to have the expected sign. Further, the results also suggest 
that asset risk is now not statistically significant. Moreover, the results also 
suggest that consumers value positive and significantly the number of branches 
and the number of employees per branch. Finally, the results also report that 
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consumers value significantly the bank’s age, preferring more recent banks. This 
might be reasonable if we consider that more recent banks are typically more 
technology-driven, which, considering the current environment, may constitute 
a preferable attribute. All remaining bank characteristics are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that they do not impact the consumers decision-making 
process. I interpret the difference in the estimates obtained when using ordinary 
least squares (in column (i)) and instrumental variables (in column (ii)) as 
indicative that correcting for price endogeneity matters. 
 
The standard multinomial logit demand model assumes unreasonable 
substitution patterns. To account for this problem, the third specification 
estimates a nested multinomial logit demand model, more flexible than the 
standard model. As discussed above, in order to estimate the nested model, I 
have to define a priori the groups of the banks in the market. To do so, the 
number of states in which the bank has presence is now dropped as an observed 
characteristic and is now used to nest the banks into two groups: the ones that 
operate in more than one state and the ones that operate in exactly one state. The 
estimation results for the third specification, based on both cost shifters and on 
BLP instruments, indicate that service fees and loan interest rates remain highly 
significant and have the expected sign. Further, the results also suggest that asset 
risk remains not statistically significant. Moreover, the results also suggest 
consumers value significantly the bank’s age, preferring again more recent 
banks. All remaining bank characteristics are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that they do not impact the consumers decision-making process. 
Finally, the results suggest that the true value of 𝜎 ranges from 0,75 to 0,82, which 
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I interpret as indicative that the nested logit demand model is consistent with 
consumer utility maximization.7  
 
 
      OLS IV 
Explanatory variables 
    (i) 
LOGIT 
   (ii) 
LOGIT 
    (iii) 
NESTED 
Service fees -61,319** -294,720*** -75,756*** 
 (24,612) (85,252) (12,337) 
Loan interest rate -9,993* -149,218*** -30,147*** 
 (5,606) (29,935) (5,803) 
Asset Risk -13,546** 1,374 -3,363 
 (4,919) (10,123) (3,453) 
Nr of employees per branch <0,001* <0,001** <0,001 
 (<0,001) (<0,001) (<0,001) 
Nr of branches 0,004*** 0,002*** 0,0004* 
 (0,001) (0,001) (<0,001) 
Bank’s age 0,057*** -0,247*** -0,036*** 
 (0,011) (0,064) (0,011) 
Nr of states of bank’s operations -0,559*** -0,067  
 (0,145) (0,096)  
𝑙𝑛 (𝑠𝑗|𝑔)   0,786*** 
   (0,020) 
    
R-squared 0.913 
  
First-stage R-Sq. (Service fees)  0,982 0,709 
First-stage R-Sq. (Loan int. rate)  0,705 0,983 
Bank and Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES 
Table II – Demand Estimation Results 
Estimated standard errors, robust and clustered by years are in parentheses. Year and bank fixed 
effects are included in all models. 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
                                                 
7 I also estimated the nested logit model using bank size as groups, as seen in Dick (2008). The bank size was 
determined by the amount of assets a bank owned. However, regardless of price variables, none of the variables 
was significant. Therefore, I chose to use the number of states in which a bank operates as nests. The results are 
not show in this paper. 
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4.1. Literature Comparison 
Molnár, et al. (2006) and Nakane, et al. (2006) are, to the best of my knowledge, 
the only two examples in the literature that estimate demand for loan services. 
 
Molnár et al. (2006)’s results differ substantially from mine. The number of 
branches and the number of employees per branch are reported to have a positive 
and significant impact on demand for loans, whereas the bank’s age is reported 
to have a positive and significant impact in some type of loans, such as higher 
purchase and personal loans, but has an insignificant impact on other types such 
as overdrafts. Contrarily, my results suggest that, except for the the price 
variables and the bank’s age, neither of the other characteristics has an impact on 
the decision-making process. Concerning the bank’s age characteristic, my 
results state that it has a significant and negative impact on loans, whereas they 
report that it has a positive and significant impact. 
 
Nakane et al. (2006)’s results also differ slightly from mine. The number of 
states in which the bank has presence is reported to have a negative and 
significant influence on demand, whereas the branch density and bank’s age are 
reported to have a positive and significant impact on demand for loans. Which 
contrasts with my results, since I report that the bank’s age has a negative and 
significant impact on the demand for loans, and that the other characteristics do 
not impact demand. 
4.2. Asset Risk 
The main research question of this thesis is to examine whether the loan 
portfolio quality of a bank impacts the decision-making process of consumers 
when purchasing loan services. Lending is the primary source of revenue for 
banks and, therefore, it is natural that, on one hand, banks may take too much 
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risk and, on the other hand, regulators intend to discourage the amount of risk 
that banks take. In the case of deposit services, the answer would be relatively 
straightforward, although there are deposit insurances provided by the FDIC, 
consumers would typically prefer more secure and sound banks. However, in 
the case of loan services, the answer is not so straightforward. On one hand, 
consumers may believe that if a bank has a riskier loan portfolio, they will more 
easily approve them a loan. On the other hand, it might not be a good sign of the 
bank’s health and, therefore, consumers may prefer to choose a less taking-risk 
bank. This constitutes an empirical question. The results for my preferred 
specification, the third specification, seem to suggest that the first effect 
dominates the second, with consumers being estimated not to react to asset risk 
when choosing loan services.  
4.3. Price elasticities 
Table III presents the distribution of own-price elasticities for service fees and 
loan interest rates, computed using the estimates for my preferred specification. 


























∗ ] (26) 
 
The median own-price elasticity associated to loan interest rates is -5,7, 
whereas the median own-price elasticity associated to service fees is -0,04. The 
former suggest that banks do not have high market power when setting interest 
rates. If the bank raised the interest rate by 1%, the demand for loans services 
would decrease by 5,7%. The latter is, in absolute terms, smaller than one, which 
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suggests that banks have high market power when setting service fees and are 
clearly not profit maximizing. If the bank raised service fees by 1%, the demand 
for loans would only decrease by 0,04%. The question is: why do banks choose 
not to raise service fees until they reach the elastic portion of the demand curve? 
Dick (2008) argues that there are many explanations for this phenomenon. One 
of the arguments is that banks may choose to have service fees close to zero since 
it is a way of attracting and locking-in consumers that will later on purchase more 
services.  
 
Variable 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Loan interest rate -12,44453 -7,638501 -5,69596 -4,799161 -3,471927 
Service fees -0,85410 -0,38170 -0,04133 0,00000 0,00000 




This paper estimates the demand for loan services in the U.S. banking industry 
using a nested multinomial logit demand model, estimated using two types of 
instrumental variables: cost shifters and BLP instruments. The results seem to 
suggest that consumers respond negative and significantly to loan interest rates, 
service fees, and to the banks’ age. The results also seem to suggest that 
consumers do not significantly respond to asset risk, the number of employees 
per branch, and the number of branches.  
 
The estimated substitution patterns seem to suggest that banks enjoy high 
market power when setting service fees, since the median own-service fees 
elasticity is -0,04, which in absolute terms is smaller than one and therefore 
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indicates that banks are not profit maximizing. The estimated substitution 
patterns seem also to suggest that banks do not enjoy high market power when 
setting loan interest rates, since the median own-interest rate elasticity is -5,7. 
 
This thesis leaves many unanswered questions, which could be addressed 
using my framework. First, if data becomes available, it would be interesting to 
examine the determinants of bank lending in other financial institutions (and not 
only in commercial banks). Second, asset risk may be an important determinant 
of deposit services, since consumers might be more conscious when choosing 
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